Ini ada tulisan dari rekan blogger saya Ana Uswatun K dari Kulliyyah of ICT, International Islamic University Malaysia. Beliau menulis tentang e-voting yang dimungkinkan tidak dapat diterapkan dalam PEMILU. Kebetulan saya sedang meneliti Electronic Voting di Indonesia, saya mendapat masukan berharga dari beliau lewat tulisannya. walaupun ada beberapa pendapat yang tidak sama pendapatnya dengan saya.

Electronic Voting Should Not Be Applied in Political Election

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Written by: Ana Uswatun k.

Electronic voting (e-voting) is being popular to conduct more efficient, simple and effective political election. This is because of the improvement of internet usage in government, such as the e-government, e-democracy, e-governance, etc. [1]. Although the system is widely implemented, electronic voting should not be applied in political election.

E-voting system involves a machine called direct recording electronics (DRE). The voters make their ballot choices using an input decide, such as a touch screen or keypad, and then the vote will be recorded.  Then the DRE will transfer the data to the central system. [2]

There are many countries implemented e-voting to choose their president or prime minister. United States implemented to Bush-Gore election [3]. Not only in US, electronic voting also applied in Europe, India, Slovenia, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, etc.[4]. On the other side, there are countries that stopped to use e-voting such as Ireland and Dutch.

There are some aspects that make e-voting become more popular. Some major reasons are the efficiency to deliver the result, reducing the cost to conduct an election, and widening access to the voting process for voter with disabilities or those who have physical difficulties to present at the pooling station.

Although e-voting gives flexibility with respect of timeframes and the accessibility of pooling stations, the history record gave a bad impression of e-voting. The major cases on e-voting are related to the security of the data which transferred to the central database, malware and virus attack, and the hacker attack.

Based on OCTAVE standards to analyze the security risk, in order for election to be fair, the voting process must provide a guarantee to the public [5]. E-voting should protect the security of all assets which involve in election process. Those assets are the good system process and technology, honest personnel, and eligible votes. To protect those aspects is crucial to the democracy.

One of the examples of leaking security in e-voting is Diebold case. Diebold is a company that makes and sells voting machines. The machine has been used in US election in 2004, the presidential election between G. W. Bush and John Kerry. The inaccuracy of the machines might have affected the outcome on the election [6].

Issue on the back-end system which is vulnerable to be changed is one of the attentions. Public also do not trust the result because the counting process is not known by public. Moreover, computer security experts have been evaluate Diebold system and conclude that the voting system is far below the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts, the system is at high risk of compromise. [7]

After the election is finish, it is possible that dissatisfaction happen. It might be because of the system or the result. Here, the digital evidence produced by e-voting need to be presented in the court for justification process.

There are few aspect to make an evidence is credible. The evidence must be complete, accurate, authentic, enough and must be obtained and submitted validly. The absence of appropriate evidence opens the door to uncertainty about the true story, misconception of the reality, and injustice. [8]

In the terms of digital evidence, although there is a secure method applied in digital document called Cryptography, this technique provide weak digital evidence. Not only that, it is also not perfectly secure but also not socially accepted. [9] It is because, the e-voting result can be changed and replaced by the expertise who know the vulnerability of the system. Anyone who can access the central data can manipulate the database [10, 11]. The fact that the results are incorrect cannot be detected except by a recount of the original paper ballot.

Is electronic voting bringing an easier method to election? This is obvious question that government, experts, and society need to answer. There are difficulties to bring e-voting to real world. To secure the system and the weak evidence of the result are the main problems need to handle, it lead to the public dissatisfaction. Compare to paper voting, e-voting give faster result, but the accuracy, legitimacy and the transparency of the result is unsure. To keep one vote is critical on political election.

There are two countries that stop the use of e-voting because of above reasons, Ireland and Dutch [10, 11]. Even in the cryptography community, they never use e-voting to choose their president. Therefore, traditional method is preferred and e-voting should not be applied especially in political election.


[1] Buchsbaum, T. M. (2004): E-Voting: International Developments and Lessons Learnt, Proceedings of the ESF TED Workshop on Electronic Voting in Europe, SchlossHofen/Bregenz, and pp. 31-42.

[2] Kumagai, H.(2004). Electronic Voting: Better Elections or Just More Problems?

[3] Dahlia Malkhi, Ofer Margo, and Elan Pavlov. (2002). E-voting without ‘cryptography’. In Financial Cryptography ’02, 2002.


[5] T. W. Lauer. The risk of e-voting. Electronic Journal of e-Government, 2(3), Dec 2004 [6]“Democratic deception”, The Washington Times, October 19, 2004,

[7] Kohno, T., Stubblefield, A., Rubin, A., D., Wallach, D., S. (2004) Analysis of an Electronic Voting System. In Proc. of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 27–42, May 2004.

[8] Duarte, A. (2006). Digital Evidence-Is it admissible or good enough in court?

[9] Oppliger, R., Rytz, R. (2003).Digital Evidence: Dream and Reality. IEEE Security & Privacy

[10]Kitcat, J. (2007). Electronic Voting: A challenge to democracy? Open Rights Group.

[11] R. Gonggrijp and W.-J. Hengeveld. Studying the Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B voting computer: A computer security perspective. In Proc. EVT, Boston, MA, Aug. 2007.